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Since the 1970s there has been a large number of countries that combine formal democratic
institutions with authoritarian practices. Although in such countries the ruling elites may receive
considerable voter support they often employ several manipulation tools to control election outcomes.
A common practice of these regimes is the coercion and mobilization of a significant amount of voters
to guarantee the electoral victory. This electoral irregularity is known as voter rigging, distinguishing
it from vote rigging, which involves ballot stuffing or stealing. Here we develop a statistical test
to quantify to which extent the results of a particular election display traces of voter rigging. Our
key hypothesis is that small polling stations are more susceptible to voter rigging, because it is
easier to identify opposing individuals, there are less eye witnesses, and supposedly less visits from
election observers. We devise a general statistical method for testing whether voting behavior in
small polling stations is significantly different from the behavior of their neighbor stations in a way
that is consistent with the widespread occurrence of voter rigging. Based on a comparative analysis,
the method enables to rule out whether observed differences in voting behavior might be explained
by geographic heterogeneities in vote preferences. We analyze 21 elections in ten different countries
and find significant anomalies compatible with voter rigging in Russia from 2007-2011, in Venezuela
from 2006-2013, and in Uganda 2011. Particularly disturbing is the case of Venezuela where these
distortions have been outcome-determinative in the 2013 presidential elections.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many elections around the world end in controversies
related to alleged frauds [1]; even in mature democra-
cies, such as the US and Canada, where voter suppres-
sion scandals have made the headlines[27],[28]. Yet while
some countries aim at ensuring trust in their electoral
processes, by persecuting electoral malpractices, in oth-
ers elections may take place under regimes that lack le-
gitimacy. Regrettably, in such broken societies, electoral
irregularities may have very serious consequences rang-
ing from social instabilities to deadly violence [2]. There
exist certain types of irregularities that seem to be char-
acteristic of countries with extreme political polarization,
with zones heavily controlled by only one political party.
For example, there are viral videos filmed during Zim-
babwe elections that show electors that were forced to
vote or allegedly bused under intimidation[29]. It is an
unsolved challenge to detect such abject electoral abnor-
malities by scrutinies of the vote counting or by audits
of the electoral roll. The reason being that behind every
potential questionable vote there may exist a real elec-
tor whose vote officially counted. Such abusive practices
have been called voter rigging[30], to signal unlawful and
systematic harassments of the voters themselves (as op-
posed to distortions of the vote counts often referred to
as “vote rigging”).
Voter rigging is not exclusive of Zimbabwe. Most of the
complaints of the 2011 Russian elections came from state
employees and students who said they were pressured by
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their supervisors/professors to vote for United Russia,
which is a similar form of rigging[31]. The 2013 Venezue-
lan presidential elections also seem to have been riddled
with such voter rigging. One of the main electoral ob-
server groups of these elections (ROE-AE) reported acts
of violence or authority abuse during the election-day in
9.3% of the observed voting centers. ROE-AE denounced
that in the 4.7% of the cases there were infringements to
the regulation on assisted voting[32]. These violations
were used for compelling the voters to vote for the ruling
party, according to the main opposition candidate[33].
The lack of integrity of the electoral process was such
that the operations’ headquarters of ROE-AE suffered a
violent assault[34]. To our knowledge, this is the first
time such an incident occurs in Venezuela. Another im-
portant electoral observation organization reported pres-
sures on voters at different times during the day. In
15.1% of the 391 observed voting centers, voter mobi-
lization took place with public resources mainly belong-
ing to government authorities and allied governorships
and mayorships[35]. In the opposition’s appeal to the
Venezuelan Supreme Court[36], where the outcome of
the elections were contested, the inclusion of many small
voting centers sensitive to voter rigging was mentioned.
Indeed, a point can be made that small centers might be
particularly susceptible to voter rigging since it is easier
to identify opposing individuals; these centers almost of-
ten lie in alleged pro-government areas, there are less eye
witnesses; and they are visited less frequently be election
observers. However, beyond some undoubted proofs of
voter rigging in a few voting centers, supported by ama-
teur videos and observers’ testimonies, there is no sound
analysis about whether such electoral irregularities were
isolated occurrences or if they happened on a larger scale,
2to the point of determining the winner of the election.
In this paper we provide a general method for testing
irregularities of election outcomes due to voter rigging.
We hypothesize that the presence of voter rigging leads
to a characteristic distortion in the election results that
is especially discernible in small polling stations. The
method is applied to the results of 21 elections in ten
different countries. In particular we developed a statisti-
cal significance test that allows us to investigate whether
the voting behavior in small polling stations is substan-
tially different from large stations in a way that is con-
sistent with the widespread occurrence of voter rigging.
The possibility of voter rigging in small stations is firmly
rejected by our method in several elections in eight coun-
tries, including Venezuela before the current ruling party
controlled the electoral power [3]. We observe a turn-
ing point in the size of election irregularities between
2004 and 2006 in Venezuela culminating in an outcome-
determinative effect of voter rigging in the 2013 presiden-
tial elections. In these elections, the voting behavior in
small stations shows irregularities that can exceed the ex-
pected fluctuations of the results in the absence of voter
rigging by a factor of almost ten. The only other country
where we observe anomalies of a comparable dimension
is Russia, where the political landscape is dominated by
United Russia.
The statistical detection of electoral fraud is not a new
issue. A number of scholars have been engaged in the
study of this discipline during the past decade [4]. Among
the most commonly-used statistical methods are those
based on Benford’s laws [5, 6] and other tests which also
focus on the distribution of digits in vote counts [7, 8]. In
a separate category, we can group various tools developed
for the detection of anomalies in the distribution of votes
and voter turnout [9–12]. In a third category, we may
include analyses based on exit poll [13] and other kinds
of sampling data [14, 15]. Of interest are also studies
that adopt a statistical mechanics approach to under-
stand the statistical regularities in the vote counts [16].
Particularly relevant are studies on the spatial correlation
of turnout rates at the scale of municipalities [17]. Now,
in order to incorporate spatial statistics for election fraud
detection, we must consider more desegregated data sets,
as it is well known that high levels of aggregation may
mask electoral fraud [18]. Furthermore, we have to an-
alyze not only turnout rates but the complete election
data set including vote counts.
II. DATA AND STATISTICAL TOOLS
A. Data
For each election, we consider its vote counting at the
finest available level of data collection that we denomi-
nate electoral unit. Such units may be known as electoral
tables, wards, or precincts, according to the election un-
der study. We only use datasets that contain more than
TABLE I: List of the 21 elections under study, with the num-
bers of electoral units that fulfill the inclusion criteria for our
analysis, N . The average number of electors of these electoral
units, µn, is also given together with its standard deviation,
σn.
country year N µn σn
Austria 2008 2,379 2,700 8,400
Canada 2011 66,262 360 110
Finland 2011 2,352 1,900 1,600
France 2007 36,219 1,200 5,400
Mexico 2006 125,635 560 130
Mexico 2012 142,448 560 140
Russia 2003 95,181 1,100 900
Russia 2007 96,192 1,100 890
Russia 2011 95,057 1,100 860
Russia 2012 95,573 1,200 870
South Africa 2009 19,725 1,200 1,000
Spain 2008 59,346 570 190
Spain 2011 59,876 570 190
Uganda 2011 23,968 580 220
Venezuela 1998 20,026 550 170
Venezuela 2000 10,340 1,100 700
Venezuela 2004 23,562 590 140
Venezuela 2006 32,336 480 110
Venezuela 2012 38,853 480 110
Venezuela 2013 39,006 480 110
Venezuela 2015 40,546 480 110
1, 000 electoral units for which turnout, votes for the win-
ner, and the number of electors in the unit, denoted by
n, are all known and compatible. For each country, we
also consider its partition into administrative divisions.
If different subdivisions are available, we use the smallest
available territorial subdivision, seeking similarity among
the units belonging to the same division. We refer to
these divisions as electoral neighborhoods. They may cor-
respond to different types of administrative entities de-
pending on the country, such as departments, parishes,
counties, districts or municipalities. To ensure that the
partition is sufficiently fine, we only consider datasets
with more than 100 electoral neighborhoods. However,
we require that each neighborhood has at least 10 elec-
toral units in order to perform statistical tests of simi-
larity among them. Ten countries that we are aware of
provide data that fulfill the above criteria. We study
21 key elections of these countries listed in Table I, to-
gether with the numbers of electoral units that meet our
inclusion criteria, denoted by N , the average number of
electors per unit of these electoral units, denoted by µn,
and the corresponding standard deviation, σn. Across
all the selected elections, µn only varies in one order of
magnitude, which shows that the datasets have a com-
parable level of resolution. In addition, σn/µn < 1 for
all elections, except for Austria and France, which also
shows also a comparable relative standard deviation of
the number of electors per unit on 19 of the 21 case stud-
ies.
3B. Standardized Election Fingerprints (SEF)
Let us denote by t the turnout percentage per electoral
unit and by vw the corresponding percentage of votes
going to the winner. The so called election fingerprint,
namely a 2D-histogram for t and vw, has proved to be a
valuable tool for fraud detection [10] and is the starting
point to introduce our methodology. The key idea for
taking advantage of the election fingerprints is that they
must fit approximately an uncorrelated bivariate normal
distribution. Nevertheless, this hypothesis may fail for
many reasons. For instance, vw might get inflated in a
fraudulent way by adding to it votes from the non-voters
(ballot stuffing). In the election fingerprints this type of
fraud will introduce a positive correlation between t and
vw. Alternatively, vw might be increased by adding votes
from opposition parties (vote stealing), which would lead
to an inflation of vw in the election fingerprints, but not a
simultaneous inflation of t. There are also non-fraudulent
mechanisms that can explain observed discrepancies be-
tween the election fingerprint of some countries and the
uncorrelated bivariate Gaussian distribution. For exam-
ple, heterogeneity in the electoral population: countries
with two or more regions with different electoral behav-
ior may correspond to Gaussian mixture models, which
may provide multimodal fingerprints. This can happen
if each region fits a normal distribution with different
means and variances among the regions. This appears to
be the case of the 2011 Canadian elections where the fin-
gerprint splits Quebec from English Canada [10]. On the
other hand, one may expect some sort of correlation be-
tween t and wv, especially if the voters of some electoral
units are mobilized to support an option different from
their first preferences in order to prevent an undesirable
outcome (strategic vote). Strategic vote is common in
several countries with proportional representation elec-
toral systems [19] and could explain the aspects of the
Finnish and Austrian fingerprints, among others [10].
In order to provide an alternative forensic tool to the
election fingerprints that is sturdier against the effects
of the non-fraudulent scenarios discussed above, we con-
sider a stratified normalization of the percentages t and
vw that we name the election Z-scores. Therefore we
compare vote and turnout at a particular unit to the re-
sults of units in its neighborhood, see Figure 1. Namely,
the Z-scores of the electoral unit i are
Zt(i) =
t(i)− µt(i)
σt(i)
and Zvw(i) =
vw(i)− µvw(i)
σvw(i)
, (1)
where µt(i) and σt(i) denote the average and standard
deviation of t over the units lying in the neighborhood
of unit i and µvw(i) and σvw(i) the corresponding av-
erage and standard deviation of vw. We will refer to
the 2d histograms of the Zt and Zvw values for a given
election as its Standardized Election Fingerprint (SEF).
For an easier accessible visualization, we will represent
these 2d histograms also by smoothed level curves for
the joint density of data points, see Materials and Meth-
electoral unit i
electoral neighborhood of i
FIG. 1: Schematic overview of how to compute the Z-scores.
In this illustration we show electoral units (circles) with dif-
ferent electorate sizes n (indicated by the size of the circles).
The colors of the units correspond to different electoral neigh-
borhoods. The neighborhood of i is defined as all other units
that lie in the same electoral neighborhood (blue lines). To
correct for geographic heterogeneities in the data, the vote
and turnout percentages of each unit i are rescaled by their
average value and standard deviation in the electoral neigh-
borhood of i
ods section; different density levels are represented by
proportional color intensities.
C. Statistical test for voter rigging
We now introduce a statistical test for the detection
of voter rigging in small electoral units by developing a
comparative election forensic tool based on SEFs and Z-
scores of different countries. But first, let us introduce
some additional notation. Let us index all elections in
our data by the index k. Denote by S(k, p) the set of
electoral units with less electors than the p-th percentile
of the number of electors per the electoral unit (small
units) in election k. Let L(k, p) be the complementary set
of electoral units (large units). In the following we only
consider cases where S(k, p) and L(k, p) contain, both,
at least ten elements. We are interested in the detection
of outlier elections in the sense that the joint distribution
of the Z-scores in S(k, p) units (SEF of small units) dif-
fers significantly from the distribution of the Z-scores in
L(k, p) units (SEF of large units). This matter leads to
a bivariate two-sample problem, a statistical problem of
permanent interest per se. As it is well known, the avail-
able tests for these problems usually depend on the kind
of problem under consideration [20]. Our approach is
based on a simple comparison between the SEFs of small
and large units. Without dismissing the potential useful-
4ness of other discrepancy measures between distributions,
we will address the comparison between the SEFs of small
and large units by considering the distance between their
centers. For simplicity, we will consider a standardized
Euclidean distance between the centers of these distribu-
tions. Estimating the coordinates of the centers by the
median of the related Z-scores, this is
mSt (k, p) = median[Zt(i), i ∈ S(k, p)], (2)
and similarlymSvw(k, p), m
L
t (k, p) andm
L
vw(k, p), the plu-
gin estimator of the distance between the centers is
Dk(p) =
√
[mSt (k, p)−m
L
t (k, p)]
2 + [mSvw(k, p)−m
L
vw(k, p)]
2. (3)
A central idea of the statistical test for voter rigging
is to compare values of the distance Dk(p) for election
k to its expectation from a set of different, trustwor-
thy elections. To this end we compute the values of
Dk(p) over all considered elections and identify the out-
liers in this set using the modified Thompson Tau test
at a given confidence level α, see Materials and Meth-
ods. This test is applied to a wide range of choices of
p, p ∈ {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, . . . , 90}. We obtain a reference set
of (trustworthy) elections, R, by considering all elections
that are not classified as outliers for at least (1−α)·100%
of size thresholds p. As a measure for the effect size for a
given election we rescale its value of Dk(p) by the mean
and standard deviation of the corresponding distances of
elections contained in R. Hence, we consider the stan-
dardized Euclidean distance
δk(p) =
Dk(p)−mean[Dl(p), l ∈ R]
std[Dl(p), l ∈ R]
, (4)
with mean[Dl(p), l ∈ R] and std[Dl(p), l ∈ R] being
the mean and standard deviation taken over trustwor-
thy elections. Thus, δk(p) values far from zero imply
atypical distances, unexpected in free and fair elections.
In particular we can provide a rejection region at a given
significance level for δk(p) for the hypothesis of voter rig-
ging in election k by considering the rejection region of
the corresponding modified Thompson Tau test. If δk(p)
lies outside of this region and, additionally, the center of
the SEF for election k of small units is inside the upper
right region of the plot, the outcome of election k is com-
patible with the hypothesis of large-scale voter rigging in
small electoral units.
III. RESULTS
Figure 2 shows the election fingerprints as introduced
in [10] and the SEFs of several elections (Venezuela 1998
and 2013, Russia 2011, Austria 2008, Canada 2011, and
Spain 2008). Note that the stratified standardization
in the SEFs corrects multimodality (Canada) and het-
erogeneous voter mobilization (Austria) that has been
observed in previous versions of election fingerprints.
Nonetheless, there is no reason to believe that SEFs
should fit an uncorrelated bivariate normal model, such
as it has been suggested for the fingerprints. The single
presence of strategic voting may introduce some corre-
lation between Zt and Zvw, because more turnout may
be associated to mobilizations for or against the win-
ner. If the electoral neighborhoods are properly chosen,
making them homogeneous, asymptotic arguments can
be invoked to argue that the empirical marginal distribu-
tions of the Z-scores should be approximately a standard
normal distribution, although with more extreme values
than the ones expected for a Gaussian sample [3, 12].
Therefore, the only claim that we can assert is that the
joint distribution should be unimodal, centered on the
origin, and roughly supported on a high confidence nor-
mal area. Additionally, we expect a particular symmetry
for the SEF of an election where fraud is dismissed. This
becomes apparent in a contour visualization of the 2d
histograms over all electoral units for several elections,
see Figure 3. The SEFs of these elections appears to be
elliptically symmetric.
Figure 4 shows visualizations of the SEFs for small
and large electoral units, by using contour lines. In this
figure, small (large) units are those that have an elec-
torate size below (above) the p = 20 percentile. Similar
results can be observed for all other reasonable choices
of p. To rule out that our results are not driven by few
small electoral units of questioned elections with atypical
vote counting, we perform a simple outlier-removal pro-
cedure of Z-scores based on the observed elliptical sym-
metry (see Materials and Methods). For Venezuela 1998,
Canada 2011 and Spain 2011 the centers of the SEFs for
small and large units coincide and the shapes of the dis-
tributions are hard to distinguish. This is not the case
for Venezuela 2013 and Russia (2011 and 2012). The
Z-scores of these elections are substantially shifted to-
wards the upper right regions of the plot for small units.
This means higher turnout values and larger numbers
of votes for the winner in small electoral units as ob-
served in their direct neighborhood, a clear evidence of
a systematic distortion of the election outcomes in these
units that is consistent with the effects of voter rigging
in such places. In order to systematically quantify these
distortions, we consider as effect size the distance δ(p),
which gives the number of standard deviations by which
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the centers of small and large centers are displaced from
each others as measured over a set of non-outlier elec-
tions. Figure 5 shows results for δ(p) for the 21 elections
given in Table I. The gray region in Figure 5, the “ac-
cepted region”, contains the results for all elections that
are not classified as outliers according to the majority
of outcomes of the modified Thompson Tau test. Elec-
tions that lie outside of this region show results that are
compatible with the assumption of widespread voter rig-
ging in small electoral units. We observe the strongest
effects in Venezuela between 2006 and 2013, with δ(p)
values that almost reach a factor of 10 for size thresholds
around the 5th percentile. Nevertheless, the values of
δ(p) clearly lie outside of the accepted region for a wide
range of choices of p Intriguingly, such strong deviations
are totally absent from the Venezuelan data in prior elec-
tions as well as in the last Venezuelan parliamentary elec-
tion, 2015. The Russian elections between 2007 and 2012
also show significant deviations with δ(p) between 4 and
7. Significant results are also found for Russian 2003 and
Uganda, however with substantially smaller effect sizes
with values between 3 and 4. Certainly, these anomalous
results for Russia, Uganda and Venezuela may be traces
of voter rigging in small electoral units and raise serious
doubts regarding the integrity of the related elections.
Note that the accepted region in Figure 5 encapsulates
elections that show deviations below three standard devi-
ations, in consistency with a confidence level of α = 0.95.
The deviations in Russia from 2007–2012 and Venezuela
2006–2013 therefore indicate truly extreme events.
A different visualization of the atypical results reported
for Russia, Uganda and Venezuela from 2006–2013 is pro-
vided in the inset in Figure 5. Here, the electoral units
are sorted according to their number of electors in a de-
scending way. We then compute the percentages of votes
for the winners over all units up to the given rank i (i.e.
above the corresponding number of electors). This num-
ber is denoted cumi(vw). If the voting behavior in the
units is independent from the size of the unit, we expect a
slope of zero for cumi(vw) for high ranks i. This means
that the addition of increasingly small units does not
change the overall results of the elections. For Uganda
we observe a logarithmic increase of cumi(vw) from rel-
atively large electoral units. We observe a different pat-
tern for Russia and Venezuela, where cumi(vw) clearly
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2011. However, there is a clear discrepancy in the SEFs of
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2012. The rescaled turnout and the votes for the winner are
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is clear evidence that the election outcomes in these small
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FIG. 5: Results of the statistical test for voter rigging, quan-
tified by the effect size δ(p), are shown for 21 different elec-
tions. The gray region contains the elections with no signifi-
cant differences between small and large electoral units. These
elections are also shown as dash-dotted lines. Solid lines
show elections that are compatible with the voter-rigging-
in-small-centers hypothesis. These include the elections in
Russia, Uganda as well as Venezuela from 2006-2013, where
the strongest effects are observed. In the inset we show a
different visualizations of the atypical results observed from
Russia, Uganda and Venezuela. In there, the electoral units
are sorted in a descending way according to their number of
electors and the percentage of votes for the winner is com-
puted using only units up to the given rank on the x-axis (in
logarithmic scale). For Venezuela 2013 it is only the addition
of small units that pushes the results to determine the winner.
increases at the smallest units. This means that the addi-
tion of these small units has a substantial impact on the
election outcomes. For Russia 2011 and Venezuela 2013
we note that it is indeed the contributions from the very
small units that pushes the total number of votes to the
barrier of 50%. In the Venezuelan case, where the current
president (Nicola´s Maduro) was elected by a plurality
voting system, the systematic distortion of voting behav-
ior in small electoral units was outcome-determinative.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this article we develop a method for testing statisti-
cal anomalies of election results in small polling stations
attributable to voter rigging. In particular, we devise
a comparative tool based on Standardized Election Fin-
gerprints (SEF) of different countries. Our analysis of
twenty-one national elections in ten countries shows sig-
nificant impacts in Venezuela 2006-2013, Russia 2007-
2012 and, to a lesser extent, in Russia 2003 and Uganda
2011. Particularly, traces of voter rigging are outcome-
determinative in one case: the 2013 Venezuelan presiden-
tial elections.
In Russia and Venezuela from 1999 onwards with
the assumption of power by Vladimir Putin and Hugo
Cha´vez, respectively, the dominant elites have progres-
sively established an authoritarian competitive regime
that combines formal democratic institutions with au-
thoritarian practices. The ruling elites hold regular elec-
tions and tolerate some degree of freedom and compe-
tition for power, but on an uneven level playing field
where it is very difficult for the opposition to win [21].
In fact, the ruling party has always won in Russia and
in Venezuela, of the many elections held at the national
level, the Chavismo has only lost a constitutional referen-
dum in 2007 and, more recently, the parliamentary elec-
tions of 2015. To stay in power, the elites have resorted
to a mix of tools and practices to control the elections
[22]. Although the types and intensity of irregularities
have varied over time, these include the banning of par-
ties and disqualification of candidates, the abuse of state
resources, hindrances and restrictions on free press with a
clear predisposition towards the officialism in public me-
dia, biased electoral authority, no reliable electoral reg-
ister, unfair electoral rules, and electoral fraud. These
two hybrid regimes have turned more authoritarian in
recent years, but, according to Freedom House, while
Venezuela remains partly free, Russia is rated as not free
since 2006[37].
The integrity of the Venezuelan electoral system has
been questioned since the holding of the presidential re-
call referendum in 2004 [3]. An irregularity associated
with our research has been the political and labor dis-
crimination practices developed by the officialism against
many citizens for signing a form to activate the recall ref-
erendum against then President Cha´vez. Shortly after-
wards, a list with the signatures was made public (Tasco´n
7list) and was later refined with personal data, including
benefits from any social mission (Maisanta list) [23]. In
the public sphere, such practice created a climate of in-
timidation and mobilization of the vote for the ruling
party. Despite some complaints in the media and re-
ports by human rights organizations during the following
years, this discrimination seems to have lost momentum
after the period 2005-2006. Yet the mobilization of em-
ployees continued. In fact, the massive growth of highly
clientelistic public employment enabled the officialism to
mobilize employees at times with warnings and threats
should they not support the Chavista government. How-
ever, the acute socio-economic crisis of recent years has
made more difficult for officialism to mobilize voters but
with its victories no mayor consequences were observed.
That changed when the ruling party lost the parliamen-
tary elections of 2015. Public employees have denounced
to the media intimidation and verbal aggressions by their
superiors[38]. Additionally, in Venezuela other tactics
to influence/pressure the voter in the last elections have
become predominant. Firstly, through assisted voting,
which may be associated with voter coercion. It was
detected in 6,3% of polling stations observed in 2012,
4,7% in 2013, and up to 6% in 2015, mainly on citizens
that were pressured to vote for candidates of the ruling
party[39]. Secondly, the growth of small centers in the
last decade. The electoral organism (CNE) has justified
its policy on the grounds of the need to decentralize large
centers and increase the number of centers in rural areas.
However, these centers are more prone to irregularities
and acts of intimidation/violence on election-days. In
these small centers votes are mainly from citizens depen-
dent on government social programs which make them
very vulnerable to the modus operandi of the official ma-
chinery. In extremely competitive elections, such as the
2013 presidential elections, a manipulation in these cen-
ters may be critical to win the majority. What happened
in the 2015 parliamentary elections? The types of irreg-
ularities reported two years before had less impact. In
addition to lower mobilization of chavistas, largely due
by the country’s crisis, two factors seem to have played
an important role: the deployment by opposition forces
of activists and students, particularly in areas controlled
by chavismo and therefore more vulnerable to possible
fraud, and the institutional role played by the Armed
Forces in an election more constrained by a stronger mon-
itoring of the international community.
In Russia, on the other hand, elections have not
reached the minimum standards to be considered demo-
cratic. Pressure on voters is clearly apparent. In the
parliamentary elections of 2003, there is evidence of pres-
sure on several thousands of workers who were instructed
by their employers to request absentee ballots and who
were subsequently bused the day of the election so that
their vote could be monitored in previously designated
centers under threat, in some cases of job loss[40]. In
the parliamentary 2007 elections, there were allegations
of threats against voters, of misuse of absentee ballots,
and of voters being bused to designated centers[41]. In
the parliamentary elections of 2011, public officials were
asked to sign letters of support for the ruling party.
Owners of large companies also pressured their employ-
ees, instructed by local authorities to vote for United
Russia[42]. Like in the 2011 elections where electoral
fraud led to widespread demonstrations, the 2012 presi-
dential elections were marred by a large number of irreg-
ularities although with a smaller impact on the electoral
results. Compared to previous elections, it has been re-
ported that in 2012 there was a major attempt to control
the vote by such practices as massive voting using absen-
tee voting certificates (AVCs) or requiring employees to
vote at their workplaces[43]. We observe greater statis-
tical traces of pressure on voters in polling stations in
the 2011 parliamentary elections where several types of
fraud have been analyzed. A field experiment study car-
ried out in Moscow estimates the size of fraud in voting
shares for the ruling party United Russia to be 11% [15].
A more recent research has shown that the mix of elec-
toral manipulation (electoral fraud, ballot stuffing, and
voter pressure) used by incumbents varied across regions
according to the competitive conditions. In particular,
voter pressure was more common in competitive areas
[24]. To these findings we add the atypical skewing elec-
toral behavior in small polling stations in order to under-
stand the victory of the incumbent party.
To conclude, the 2011 elections in Uganda require a
totally different assessment. This country has enjoyed a
more competitive landscape since the reintroduction of
multiparty elections in 2005, but it has maintained the
characteristics of electoral authoritarianism, key to keep-
ing the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in power.
In 2011, three practices common in past elections, also
prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa, are observed: intimida-
tion, vote-buying and vote rigging [25]. In the context of
the so-called monetization of elections, pressure on some
voters was exerted through bribery (warning them of the
consequences if they did not vote for the candidate who
had bought their vote) and through the government de-
velopment programs (threatening voters with the loss of
benefits if they did not vote for the NRM)[44]. In this
case the statistical traces of bribery resemble those of
voter rigging in the other two countries. The smaller
the center, the larger the share of vote buying (Fig. 5).
However, our method does not contemplate the difference
between the mere purchasing of voting and the combina-
tion of buying and coercion. In light of all these results, it
is unclear to us which of the following two facts is more
disturbing, namely (i) that such large-scale distortions
of vote preferences keep recurring to the point that they
may be outcome-determinative or (ii) that such practices
are so blatantly committed that they are hidden in plain
statistical sight.
8V. MATERIALS AND METHODS
A. Visualization of the SEFs
We apply a convolution filter to the raw data of the
election fingerprints, bottom row in Fig. 2, to obtain the
smoothed contour visualizations for the SEFs, see Fig. 3.
Thereby we follow standard procedures by convoluting
the raw data twice with a convolution kernel given by a
ten-by-ten matrix with all entries being 0.01.
B. Modified Thompson Tau Test
This is a statistical test to identify outliers in a set
of observations. The test has the advantage that it
takes the observations’ average and standard deviation
into account. Let x be a vector of n observations with
average mean(x) and standard deviation std(x). Fur-
thermore, denote by tα/2 the 1 −
α
2
× 100 percentile
of the Student’s t distribution with n − 2 degrees of
freedom. One then computes the rejection threshold
value r = tα/2(n − 1)/
√
n(n− 2 + t2α/2) and the vector
∆ = |x−mean(x)|/std(x). The test identifies the obser-
vation with the largest value ∆i as outlier if ∆i > r. If
such an outlier exists, it is removed from x and the test
procedure is applied again on the remaining observations.
The test stops once all values in ∆ are smaller than r.
C. Outliers Removal
We compute the 95% confidence ellipse for the bivari-
ate Gaussian distribution determined by the sample co-
variance matrix. Then we remove the Z-scores that lie
outside of the ellipse. Although we are not assuming
Gaussianity, in practice, this procedure corresponds to
remove around 5% of atypical electoral units of our case
studies.
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